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Counterfeiting Dali and Other Artists: 
The Art of Surrealist Deception 
 
I. Introduction 
Picture it: socialites at elegant auctions in Manhattan, bidding on elite, expensive 
pieces of art with small, numbered paddles.  This was the quintessential version of art acquisition 
for decades.  Over time, this method of transferring fine art has become less glamorous and more 
obsolete as other, more efficient methods of acquiring art work have come to fruition.  Art is a 
tangible, movable thing--, a good, a finite resource.  Plenty of copies, authorized or not, may be 
created, but there is a limited number of originals available for purchase.  
Several types of venues facilitate the sale of art.  Traditional venues include auction 
houses such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s.  Christie’s was founded in 1766, and remains one of the 
leading auction houses in the world, pricing items from $200 to $80 million.
1
   Sotheby’s, the 
other leading auction house, was founded in 1744 and has sold billions of dollars worth of 
merchandise to date, including the Star of the Season diamond for approximately $16.5 million 
in 1995.
2
   Newer platforms of selling art work include small businesses and of course, the 
internet.  The internet has caused much heated debate over art forgery.
3
  eBay has acted as the 
host for some of the most sought after con artists of today.
4
  Though eBay attempts to control the 
counterfeit art registered on its site, buyers still have a chance to purchase this art before eBay 
can effectively intervene. 
5
  Because venues have yet to find fully effective methods of 
preventing art forgery, it remains one of the most lucrative illegal activities, third only to drug 
smuggling and arms dealing. 
6
  
Counterfeit art takes its fair toll on the economy.  Regardless of whether the infringement 
is innocent or intentional, the economic consequences remain constant.  Flooding the market 
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with counterfeit works artificially decreases the prices of authentic original pieces of art.
7
  
Notwithstanding the economic impact of forged art, there are social and communal consequences 
as well.  In many instances, forged art is unloaded on unsuspecting tourists visiting a foreign 
country.  Occasionally, the victims are unsophisticated and inexperienced art buyers.
8
   The issue 
remains, how to protect consumers’ and artists’ rights in a world where counterfeiting art is a 
low-risk, high-reward crime.
9
   
 Criminal prosecution bears a high burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, and intent 
is a requirement for conviction.
10
  Civil actions are also unlikely to prove fruitful since, typically, 
the counterfeiter does not have the capital to satisfy the judgment.  Moreover, many buyers 
simply rely on a dealer’s reputation instead of hiring an independent expert, which in turn makes 
novice buyers frequent victims of fraud.
11
 
  This paper will serve to explain why the existing federal and state protections against 
selling forged art are insufficient.  First, there will be a discussion regarding the federal statutes, 
then state protections, and finally a proposed solution to the shortcomings of the existing legal 
protections and consequences of profiting from counterfeited art work.  The creation of 
counterfeit art is beyond the scope of this paper.  The concern here is centered on those who 
profit from selling counterfeit art and those harmed by this practice.  Whether the counterfeit 
work originated with the original artist or the artist sold the counterfeit art to another who knew 
or should have known the work was counterfeit is irrelevant because the end result is still fraud. 
II. Federal Protections: “Good Artists Copy, Great Artists Steal.”—Picasso 
a. Copyright Concerns 
Several federal statutes purport to protect artists’ and consumers’ rights in some fashion. 
They include: the Copyright Statute, 
12
 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
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(“RICO”) statute,13 the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC’),14  the Trademark and Trade 
Dress statutes ,
15
 the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”),16  and the National Stolen 
Property Act (“NSPA”).17   
Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, “the Congress shall have 
the Power…. [T]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing and limited times 
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”18  To 
qualify for copyright protection under this statute the work must be of a copyrightable subject 
matter, fixed in a tangible medium of expression and must have originated with the author.  
Works that fall outside the durational provision provided in 17 U.S.C. §102(a) are in the public 
domain and therefore are not protected by this statute.
19
   
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “public domain” as “the universe of inventions and 
creative works that are not protected by intellectual property rights and are therefore available for 
anyone to use without charge.”20  Any work created before the 1909 Copyright Act21 is in the 
public domain as well as any work where the copyright has lapsed.  Another alarming issue with 
copyright protection particularly in the realm of the art world, is the fact that copyrights do not 
automatically transfer with the sale of a work.
22
  The copyright protection originates with the 
author of the work.  This right may be transferred or assigned; however, the transfer is not 
automatic upon the sale of the tangible work itself.
23
 
For works protected under the 1909 Copyright Act, the copyright endured for an initial 
period of 28 years plus a renewal period of 28 years and if the author failed to renew the 
copyright, the work was injected into the public domain.
24
  This Act leaves an inordinate amount 
of art work unprotected and therefore in the public domain. Works created before 1923
25
 enjoy 
no copyright protection.  Works such as Michelangelo’s David or Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona 
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Lisa are not entitled to copyright protection because they were created before the 1909 Copyright 
Act, thus these works of art are in the public domain and high susceptible to art forgery.  Because 
the work is in the public domain, another cause of action is eliminated and this contributes to art 
forgery being classified as a low-risk, high-reward crime.  If one was sold a counterfeit work that 
falls outside the scope of protection, he would have to rely on another cause of action because he 
would not own the copyright to the work of art in the public domain.  
Under the 1976 Copyright Act works created on or after January 1, 1978 are entitled to a 
copyright period for the life of the author plus 50 years.
26
  When considering the copyright of a 
joint work, copyright protection lasts for the life of the last surviving author plus 70 years.
27
  
Copyright protection lasts 95 years from the first publication or 120 years from its creation, 
whichever expires first for anonymous works, works created under pseudonyms, and works 
created by a corporation.
28
  Moreover, in 1998, the Sonny Bono amendment was passed 
extending the duration of a copyright by 20 years, effectively extending the copyright protection 
from the life of the author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 years.
29
 
Museums have concerns regarding the copyrightable images that the museum has secured 
of a work of art.  According to the associate general counsel of the Museum of Modern Art 
(“MoMA”), Henry Lanman, the MoMA restricts distribution of the high resolution photographs 
taken of art works.
30
  Art works that are displayed in the MoMA are transported to a studio in 
Queens, New York to be photographed.  This arduous process takes several days and high 
resolution cameras are used to procure the best quality photograph possible.  There are no 
restrictions on visitors taking pictures with a personal camera once inside the museum because 
the quality of the picture could not possibly rise to the level of quality that would be competitive 
with the photos taken at the Queens location.
31
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Mr. Lanman has experience with forged labels that are affixed to the art works.  Every 
time a work is displayed in the MoMA, a label is placed on the work identifying that the MoMA 
has displayed it.  This label is valuable because it bolsters the authentication of the work, if it is 
under question.   Mr. Lanman said, “a couple times a year we receive calls from galleries or 
dealers researching a work that has a label indicting it was on loan or owned by MoMA…people 
try to forge labels all the time, dealers looking for an answer of authentication will scan the label, 
send it to me, and I will authenticate it, but it is pretty obvious when it is a fake, there have never 
been any close calls.”32  The label is part of the provenance which is the chain of ownership that 
should accompany each valuable work of art.  A genuine label affixed to the back of a work 
indicates the work is genuine.  In addition to authenticating forged labels, Mr. Lanman does 
manage the MoMA’s copyright claims to certain works. 
Mr. Lanman also posited “museums usually do not own copyrights of the work, but they 
do assert copyrights in the images of the work taken in high definition usually for the purpose of 
merchandise in the museum gift shop.  This type of assertion is very frequent and the museum 
controls access to the physical object then issues licenses in the high definition photographs.”   
Mr. Lanman described the insurance process for stolen art.  “Insurance policies are 
written in such a way to allow recovery of art work; for example, let’s say in 1970 a work was 
insured for $10,000, and that amount was paid out to the museum after the work was stolen.  
Then in 2012, the work is recovered and now worth now $500,000, the question becomes, who 
owns the work of art.  Many insurance policies will allow the insured to repay the proceeds and 
premiums to recover the work.”  Mr. Lanman then explained the purpose of stealing art in the 
first place. Obviously, any art dealer would know or come to find out the work was stolen.  Mr. 
Lanman responded, “There is essentially no art market for stolen work, except for black markets 
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that would maybe trade the art work for another illicit commodity and the art work be sold at a 
fraction of its real value.”33  
b. Defenses to Copyright Infringement  
Several defenses to copyright claims exist, including: the innocent infringer defense,
34
 de 
minimus taking,
35
 fair use,
36
 independent creation,
37
 and parody.
38
  The “innocent infringer” 
defense is available if the infringers were not aware or had no reason to believe that their acts 
constituted infringement.  If the plaintiff registered the copyright, that notice of copyright makes 
this defense unavailable to defendants.  The de minimus defense contains three components 
necessary for analysis: 1) a technical violation so trivial that the law will not impose legal 
consequences, 2) copying has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative 
threshold of substantial similarity, 3) relevant to fair use [the amount of substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole].
39
  The fair use defense uses a four 
factor test, 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole and 4) the effect 
on the potential market for the value of the copyrighted work.
40
  The Independent creation 
defense indicates that the infringer had no previous exposure or access to the work he is being 
accused of infringing upon.
41
  For a parody defense to be successful the copy must be poking fun 
at the original work and the primary use must not be commercial.
42
 However, in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music the Supreme Court held that parody could be a fair use and thus not subject to 
copyright infringement, and a commercial use was not presumptively unfair since that 
presumption would render the fair use defense effectively useless.
43
 In addition, the parody 
“must make some critical comment or statement about the original work which reflects the 
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original perspective of the parodist -- thereby giving the parody social value beyond its 
entertainment function.”44 
c. Other federal protections 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute creates criminal and civil 
liability for acts performed as part of a continuing criminal organization.  Specifically, the statute 
creates liability for the different ranking leaders of groups of organized crime.  The relevant 
statutes of the RICO provisions include § 472 
45
 and § 473.
46
  Successful RICO cases are far and 
few between, because the standard of prosecution is very high. This statute is insufficient to 
protect consumers who fall victim to art forgers. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act
47
  is another federal protection afforded to prevent 
unfair trade practices.  Federal Trade Commission Act attempts to essentially prevent unfair 
trade practices that affect commerce. Under this Act, the Commission is empowered  “to (a) 
prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) 
prescribe trade regulation rules defining with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or 
deceptive…”48  In one case where the FTC Act was utilized, Salvatore Dali signed blank sheets 
of paper to have his works reprinted on them because he was in poor health and soon would be 
unable to write his signature.
49
  The publishing company then forged more of Dali’s signatures to 
sell more Dali works and the defendant earned millions from these forged Dali prints.
50
  This act 
would constitute an unfair and deceptive act affecting commerce and therefore the defendants 
would be liable under the FTC Act.  This statute is vague regarding the characterization of unfair 
trade practices and the appropriate remedy to protect consumers is not clearly defined here. 
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Typically, trademark statutes cannot afford protection to artists because no trademark 
exists within the work and their signature on art work itself does not constitute a trademark.
51
  A 
trademark is a “word, phrase, symbol or design, or a combination of words, phrases, symbols or 
designs, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from those of 
others.” 52  The Lanham Act bars individuals from reproducing or imitating a registered 
trademark in connection with a sale of a product that is likely to cause confusion to a consumer 
or account for dilution of that trademark.
53
  Despite this protection, no damages may be 
recovered by the registrant of the trademark unless there is intent to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive.
54
  Again, this makes counterfeiting art work, which may be otherwise 
protected by trademark, a lucrative, low-risk offense since intent must be proven before damages 
can be awarded.  Another trademark statute protects against false designation of origin.
55
  In 
other words, this statute creates liability for those who falsely claim a work is authentic.
56
   An 
example would be if an artist actually signed blank sheets of paper which his work is to be 
reprinted and the publisher sold these prints as originals instead of authorized signed copies.
57
 
Trade dress may act as another federal protection to art work.  Trade dress is the design 
and shape of the materials in which a product is packaged.
58
  “Product configuration, the design 
and shape of the product itself, may also be considered a form of trade dress.”59  The Lanham 
Act protects trade dress if it serves the same source-identifying function as a trademark.  It is 
possible to register trade dress as a trademark, but for practical reasons most trade dress and 
product configurations are protected without registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
60
  This 
protection may be difficult to utilize, because most art works would typically not fit within the 
description of the definition of trade dress. 
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The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”) protects artists’ moral rights and 
provides for selected artists’ rights in their work regardless of ownership later in time.61  An 
artist’s moral rights essentially protect the work from being bastardized or distorted in anyway.62  
“The term ‘moral rights’  has its origins in the civil law and is a translation of the French le droit 
moral, which captures those rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature.”63  VARA, 
affords protection only to authors of works of visual art.
64
 
 The statute also includes a negative definition of works falling outside the scope of 
narrow protection.
65
   American copyright laws do not give rise to a cause of action for 
mutilation of an artist’s work or the presentation of the work that is portrayed to the public.  
American courts have used contract law and the law of unfair competition to provide this 
protection.
66
   VARA allows for a cause of action protecting artists’ moral rights offering 
protection on which the authors’ livelihood depends.  VARA only offers protection to artists, not 
copyright holders generally, therefore the breadth of VARA’s protection is very narrow.  For 
example, if artist A sells his painting to buyer B, VARA only protects artist A’s rights and not 
buyer B’s rights.  
Another federal criminal statute used in prosecuting is the National Stolen Property Act.
67
  
This Act provides for criminal liability for any person who “transports, transmits, or transfers in 
interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value 
of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud . . .."
68
  
This statute is used for stolen property generally, not just works of art.  In addition, the value of 
the property must be at least $5,000 in order for criminal liability to attach, leaving victims of art 
forgery that lose less than $5,000 vulnerable and not protected by this statute.  
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III. State Protections 
The broadest of state protections to protect art work stems from the state adopted 
Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”).  Karl Llewellyn served as the principle drafter of the 
U.C.C. and this code serves to codify the law of sales and other commercial transactions.
69
  Here, 
the focus of consumer protection circles around Article 2 of the U.C.C. which governs the sale of 
goods.
70
  The U.C.C. proposes several remedies for those victims of art forgery which include in 
part: breach of contract and warranties.  
The U.C.C. provides several bases for breach of contract for causes of action based on 
fraud, duress, unconscionability and others.  For example, if patrons relied to their detriment in 
purchasing a work of art that they were led to believe was authentic when negotiating the 
contract.  If that work turned out to be fake that would establish a breach of contract induced by 
fraud.  A specific prohibition against selling unauthorized works of art lies in U.C.C. §2-312.
71
  
This provision states that “title conveyed shall be good and its transfer rightful and shall not 
unreasonably expose the buyer to litigation because of any colorable claim to or interest in the 
goods.”72  In this regard, sellers cannot sell art work if they themselves do not know the rightful 
owner of the work.  This is particularly helpful in cases of stolen art work, since the title may 
belong to a previous, rightful owner and the victim was a good faith bona fide purchaser.  The 
bona fide owner could maintain a claim against the seller of the work under U.C.C. §2-312.  
Liability is created when a seller gives a buyer an express warranty about the goods being 
tendered.  For example, if a seller on eBay describes a work of art as authentic, that may be 
considered an express warranty.  This liability can be enforced under U.C.C. §2-313.
73
 
Specifically, the portion of the statute applicable in the previous example is “[A]ny affirmation 
of fact or promise made by the seller which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
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the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise.”74  In this example, the seller expressly stated that the work is authentic and therefore 
not a copy.  If the work is found to be counterfeit, the buyer may bring a claim under U.C.C. §2-
313 for breach of express warranty.  
A colorable claim regarding the breach of implied warranties may exist as well.  If 
Christie’s auctions a Picasso worth $50 million dollars, the buyer may infer that this Picasso is 
genuine and has been authenticated by an expert.  This claim may be brought under U.C.C. §2-
314(2) (c) where the warranty implies that the good is fit for its ordinary purpose, which also 
may be interpreted as the good is authentic.
75
  Another claim may be brought under U.C.C. §2-
314(3) where implied warranties of merchantability are created by the course of dealing or usage 
in the trade.
76
  Over time, Christie’s has established a reputation for selling priceless art work.  
Christie’s provided an implied warranty of merchantability in this hypothetical because a world 
renowned auction house would presumably not sell a fake Picasso for $50 million dollars.   
Another state protection is the Consumer Fraud Act.  Each state has a similar statute 
protecting consumers from fraudulent sales of goods.
77
  This Act typically extends express 
warranties about the work's authenticity and prohibits material misrepresentation or omissions.
78
 
Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to a 
buyer of such work who is not an art merchant a certificate of authenticity or any similar 
written instrument it: 
(a)  Shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and 
(b)  Shall create an express warranty for the material facts stated as of the date of such 
sale or exchange.
79
 
 
Here, the New York Consumer Fraud Act analog to the Federal Trade Commission Act is 
§13.01 Express Warranties in the New York Consolidated Laws Service.
80
  Express warranties 
that are presumed to be a basis of the bargain are created.  However, this statute only applies to 
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art merchants, thus the seller must be in the business of selling art to be found liable under this 
statute.
81
 
 There are several criminal causes of action that the state may bring against a seller of 
counterfeit or stolen art.  First and most frequently utilized to prosecute art forgery is the crime 
of larceny.  New York’s statute reads “a person steals property and commits larceny when, with 
intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he 
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.” 82  A person 
commits larceny when he or she intentionally takes the property of another.
83
  If an individual 
steals a piece of artwork then resells it, it would constitute a second crime of larceny in addition 
to the original crime of stealing the work.
84
  The statute goes on to state: 
Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property, with 
the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, committed in any of the following 
ways: (a) By conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by trespassory 
taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false 
pretenses; (b) By acquiring lost property.
85
   
 
Reselling stolen artwork would constitute larceny by deceit.  Specifically, a person 
commits grand larceny in the fourth degree if “[T]he property, regardless of its nature and value, 
is taken from the person of another.”86  A crime that an offender may typically be charged with is 
possession of stolen property.  Even if the criminal does not intend to resell what he or she has 
stolen, simply possessing the stolen property is an actionable crime.
87
  Possession of stolen 
property ranges from first to fifth degrees depending on the monetary amount the goods that 
were stolen are worth.
88
  “A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth 
degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person 
other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof.”89  Intent is the first 
element of the crime, therefore individuals that are bona fide purchasers would be protected from 
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this crime since they are unaware they are possessing stolen property.  California’s statute of 
theft is similar to New York’s for larceny.  The statute reads: 
Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal 
property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been 
entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or 
fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or 
personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth 
or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby 
fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or 
service of another, is guilty of theft. 
90
  
 
Similar to New York, California’s statute requires intentionally taking another’s property without 
permission in some manner, including deceitfully or fraudulently taking the property.
91
  
State statutes afford trademark protection which range from first to the third degree.  A 
person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree when, with the “intent to deceive 
or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, 
offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for 
sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be 
counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods.” 92  A parallel may be drawn here in 
relation to affixing fake labels to art works.
93
  Those individuals guilty of fraudulently affixing 
labels to art works known to be fake may be infringing upon the MoMA’s trademark in those 
labels.  This protection would be insufficient to protect wronged consumers on the immoral end a 
deal because the cause of action rests with the MoMA, and not with the average consumer.  
IV. Federal and State Application of Current Laws 
a. Federal application  
Several claims may be asserted against sellers of counterfeit art.  However, a vast 
majority of these causes of actions do not afford the buyer of fake art complete relief.  Several 
federal and state statutes purport to protect against art forgery.  However, none of them provide 
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the artist with adequate relief, criminally or civilly.  There is no uniform method of punishing the 
sale of forged art.  Within the existing copyright laws, trademark laws, and laws governing 
goods, a victim of art forgery must marry themselves to the statute most likely to provide relief.  
Art forgers recognize these asymmetries and frequently are able to slip through the well-
established cracks.  For example, if one is the rightful owner of a work of art but not of its 
copyright, that individual may only bring claims based on the fact that the art work is a good and 
therefore must rely on only the U.C.C. for protection.  The owner would not be able to bring a 
claim based in copyright infringement because that owner does not own the copyright to the 
work, he only owns the physical good.  
Another issue an artist may face is a work for hire dispute.  In a work for hire contract, 
the artist agrees to create a work for the hiring party, preserving the copyright in the hiring party, 
in exchange for compensation.
94
  According to 17 U.S.C §101, a work made for hire is a “work 
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or a work specially ordered 
or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work….”95  If an artist is hired by a 
patron of the arts to create a work, the copyright of that work belongs to the patron, and not the 
artist.  The hiring patron would have a copyright interest in that work of art if it were to be 
counterfeited and then later sold.  If the artist is an independent contractor and not an employee 
of the patron, it is more difficult to ascertain who the rightful owner of the copyright is.  The 
artist will argue he is not an employee of the patron and the work was not specially 
commissioned, resulting in him owning the copyright.  The patron will argue first that the artist 
is his employee and in the alternative that the patron specially commissioned the work, making 
the Patron the rightful owner of the copyright.  
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A looming issue of utilizing intellectual property law to combat the sale of forged art 
exists. A juxtaposition exists between using intellectual property laws and classifying art work as 
a good.  Intellectual property is not considered a “good” and therefore not afforded protection 
under the Uniform Commercial Code.  Two different types of claims are available when bringing 
a claim for art forgery: intellectual property claims infringement and goods.  If one chooses to 
bring a claim under an intellectual property statute, the claim would be who owns the copyright 
or trademark.  However, for those individuals who do not own the copyright or trademark, a 
U.C.C. claim may be the proper channel and, in fact, the intellectual property statutes afford no 
protection to a rightful owner of a work, even if that counterfeit work of art infringes on a 
copyright owned by a third party. 
Copyright infringement should include specific punishments, criminal and civil for art 
forgery.  The statute must outline parameters as to what constitutes infringement and what 
specifically does not constitute infringement.  To establish copyright infringement several factors 
include: whether the defendant had access to the copyrighted work prior to the creation of the 
defendant’s work and whether a substantial similarity exists in the idea and expression between 
the copyrighted work and defendant’s work.  Jurisdictions have different tests in establishing a 
copyright infringement claim.  
Two popular jurisdictions that litigate several copyright claims include the Second and 
Ninth Circuits.  In the Ninth Circuit, intrinsic and extrinsic fairness tests are applied to determine 
whether copyright infringement occurred whereas in the Second Circuit, the ordinary observer 
test is used to determine if infringement has occurred.  The Ninth Circuit describes intrinsic 
fairness as whether the two works’ “total concept and feel” are substantially similar and the 
extrinsic test compares specific, objective criteria on the basis of several elements such as 
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setting, plot, characters, etc. or in the case of art work, the elements present in the painting, 
perhaps the subject matter portrayed.
96
  If the Ninth Circuit found that two works of art were 
substantially similar in feel and concept then that fact may be enough evidence to maintain a 
copyright infringement action.  Again, there are issues with bringing a copyright infringement 
claim.  First, the plaintiff must actually hold the copyright.  Second, the intrinsic and extrinsic 
fairness tests were designed to gauge similarities in movies and books, not necessarily art work.  
It is possible that a court would stretch the factors to incorporate art works if presented with a 
persuasive enough argument.  
The Second Circuit’s test of substantial similarity asks if an ordinary observer would be 
“disposed to overlook the [similarities] and regard the aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as the 
same.”97  The Second Circuit would gauge if an ordinary reasonable observer would regard the 
offensive work as aesthetically the same as the original plaintiff’s work.  Since only expressions 
of ideas are copyrightable and ideas themselves are not copyrightable,
98
 and the art work itself is 
an expression of an idea aesthetic element is incorporated into the copyright infringement test.  
Federal trademarks are designated with this symbol: “®” and common law trademarks 
are simply marked “TM.”99  Registration is not required to maintain trademark protection.  The 
three functions of a trademark include: to identify the source of the commercial object, guarantee 
the constancy of quality, and advertise the manufacturer and attract customers.
100
  Trademark 
claims may be a superior vessel to combat art forgery since intent is not a prerequisite to liability 
as in copyright infringement cases.  Trademarks are significant to artists because trademarks 
facilitate and evoke a specific perception by the artists’ admirers.  Buyers know that when they 
see “Picasso” signed across the bottom of a painting that they are purchasing a certain quality art 
work.  However, a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a trademark, but his or her 
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name may possibly.
101
 Even if Picasso’s face graced the bottom of his art work, that picture of 
his face would generally not be trademarkable.  Picasso’s name evokes a specific perception, a 
visceral feeling that is associated with Picasso.  An individual knows that Picasso’s works are 
worth millions of dollars, that the art work comes with a certain level of prestige, and that the art 
work was created in a certain time period. 
In the Southern District of New York, a plaintiff seeking damages for a trademark 
infringement claim must show that “…[E]ither  1) the challenged advertisement is literally false 
or 2) while the advertisement is literally true, it is nevertheless likely to mislead or confuse 
consumers.”102  Art forgers, no doubt, intend to cause confusion to the unsuspecting buyer. 
However, the challenge in proving a trademark infringement case is twofold.  First, the plaintiff 
bringing the suit must own the trademark to the work.  Second, typically the artists’ signatures on 
the work of art itself are not sufficient to constitute trademarkable material.  This cause of action 
would only be successful if the plaintiff holds a registered trademark on the work of art and that 
work of art is trademarkable under the statute.  
 The Lanham Act is applied to trademark infringement cases.
103
  Trademarks allow 
customers to identify the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or a provided of a service.
104
  
Section 43 of the Lanham Act provides any person in connection with any goods using a work, 
symbol or any false designation of origin, false or misleading the description of fact which is 
likely to cause confusion by another person in commercial advertising.
105
  Essentially, if a 
trademark is misleading and promotes confusion as to that registered trademark, it is a violation 
under the Lanham Act.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits false advertising the use of 
the author’s name in connection with a work in which the author’s true participation or 
contribution is misrepresented.
106
  In the earlier example where the artist signed a blank paper to 
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be used as an authorized reproduction only, the defendant would be liable under Section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act.  The author’s true contribution would be misrepresented as the prints being sold 
as if they were originals when they really are simply authorized reproductions.  
b. State Protections   
To utilize state protections, the typical direction a plaintiff must take is that the art work 
is a “good.”  These state protections stem from the fact that the art work is a good.   Plaintiffs 
may choose to employ a state claim over a federal intellectual property claim for the simple 
reason that they do not own the intellectual property rights associated with the art.  For example, 
artist A retains all copyright interest for the next 70 years and sells the work to Sotheby’s.  
Sotheby’s then sells the artwork for $10 million dollars to buyer B.  However, during the time 
which Sotheby’s was storing the art work, a disgruntled employee stole the original work of art 
and replaced it with a well-executed copy.  When buyer B asserts a claim against Sotheby’s he 
would have no intellectual property claims because B does not own a copyright or trademark to 
the art work as the artist retained those rights.  Buyer B is left with the ability to assert several 
claims under state law, including claims supported by the U.C.C., the Consumer Fraud Act, and 
common law breach of contract.   
The U.C.C. was adopted by each state as a method of streamlining commercial 
transactions.  Prior to the adoption, most transactions were governed by “the law merchant,”107 
which simply was the collective interpretation of how sales should operate according to 
merchants in the business of selling a particular good.
108
  Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs the sale 
of goods.  Since art work is a good, Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies.  In the aforementioned 
hypothetical, buyer B is not the copyright or trademark owner, therefore, the best claim he can 
make is buttressed by the Uniform Commercial Code.   First, there must be some type of breach 
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of contract.  A contract
109
 is a legally enforceable agreement.  A breach occurs when one or both 
parties deviate from the agreed upon contract.
110
  Within the agreement, obligatory express and 
implied warranties apply to the contract.  U.C.C. §2- 312, Warranty of Title and Against 
Infringement, is one example of an implied warranty.  Sotheby’s gave an implied warranty that 
the work sold to buyer B is authentic because of Sotheby’s reputation, and the price at which the 
auction house sold the work of art.  
The U.C.C. defines “genuine” as “free of forgery or counterfeiting.”111  An individual 
paying $10 million dollars for a work of art assumes that the work is genuine, and that is part of 
the basis of negotiation for that contract.  If the work is not authentic, that automatically should 
preclude a legally binding agreement based on a litany of claims.  
Buyer B could argue that he never accepted the art work.  However, since he bought it at an 
auction that may be a difficult argument.  Alternatively, buyer B could revoke his acceptance.  
Another colorable claim by the buyer lies within U.C.C. § 2-513(3).  This section applies 
when there is a “Cash on Delivery” (“C.O.D.”)  situation.  Here, the buyer had to pay Sotheby’s 
before inspecting the good, unless the defect was overtly detectable (if for example the Picasso 
had been drawn in crayon).  Since the buyer did not have an opportunity to inspect the good, 
mere payment does not constitute acceptance under U.C.C. § 2-606.  A buyer, who pays for the 
goods in C.O.D setting before inspecting, must do so and therefore will not suffer the adverse 
consequences of acceptance.  If the court agrees that an auction is a C.O.D. situation then the 
buyer will be found to have rejected the good, and therefore will not be bound by the contract. 
If the good is non-conforming or if the good is counterfeit, the buyer's remedial 
entitlements depend on whether the buyer has accepted or not.  If the buyer has not accepted, 
then the buyer can reject under U.C.C. § 2-601 to § 2-605 and be entitled to the remedies 
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provided in § 2-712, § 2-713, § 2-715, § 2-716.  The remedies range from the seller replacing the 
good to what damages the plaintiff is entitled.
112
  Under §2-602 if the buyer seasonable notifies 
the seller of rejection, that precludes acceptance.
113
  If the buyer has accepted then the buyer 
cannot reject and must try to revoke his acceptance.  The buyer can attempt to revoke under 
U.C.C. § 2-608 and if he can do so, then the buyer is put in the same place as if he rejected the 
good in the first place.  If revocation is not available, then B is left with the sole remedy of 
money damages under U.C.C. § 2-714 and U.C.C. § 2-715.  
The standard for revocation is very high because the buyer must show substantial 
impairments in value to him personally on a subjective standard and the buyer must further 
demonstrate one of three situations in addition to substantial impairment: (1) On a reasonable 
assumption that nonconformity would be cured and it was not cured, (2) if when acceptance was 
reasonable at the time, but now because of a latent defect it is no longer acceptable (3) Seller's 
repeated assurances.
114
  B's acceptance was induced by S's aggressive assurances which deprived 
Buyer of meaningful opportunity for B to discover the defect.  In this hypothetical, there would 
be substantial impairment to the buyer, since he spent $10 million dollars on this counterfeit 
work of art.  However, the second requirement is more difficult to prove.  The best argument 
would be the second alternative, that acceptance was reasonable at the time because both the 
buyer and Sotheby’s reasonably thought this work of art was authentic and it was not found until 
later that the art work was actually an outstanding, worthless copy.  
As noted, the U.C.C. contains a host of sections that create some liability for the seller 
and some remedy for the wronged buyer.  However, the sections are geared to goods that are 
regularly bought and sold on the market and can be easily replaced as opposed to very expensive 
and seldom transferred goods, such as a multi-million dollar work of art that is a one of a kind.  
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In the hypothetical, it might prove difficult if not impossible to cure this counterfeit art situation 
since this work is the only one of its kind.  In order for Sotheby’s to cure this problem, the 
auction house would have to find the original work to replace the fake.  Sotheby’s would most 
likely end up refunding the buyer’s purchase price and may be liability for other damages under 
breach of contract. 
These works deserve an appropriately tailored statute creating liability, especially for 
intentional art forgers.  If the art forger intentionally and actively attempts to create and sell 
forged works, the punishment should be swift, harsh, and liability should be simple to impose. 
Liability should be less harsh for defendants of unintentional forgeries, similar to that in music 
infringement cases.  Of course, counterfeiting occurs on a much smaller basis as well, which 
often makes “the juice not worth the squeeze.”  In other words, the small nature of the offensive 
material does not make prosecution worth the resources.  This lack of enforcement of these 
statutes leads the forgers to continue their inapt behavior.  
If a buyer spends $300 on an “original” work that is later discovered to have been forged, 
the attorney’s fees alone make pursing this claim unreasonable.  Therefore, the only plaintiffs 
that would enjoy any type of relief are those that spend an extravagant amount of money on a 
work of art.  Another recommendation would be to have the legislature craft a statute that would 
allow a simple class action suit against the defendant. Therefore, everyone who spends $300 on 
an “original” work of art would aggregate into a class and thus stand a chance at pursuing relief.  
These are examples of civil liability.  Where there is a breach of contract claim or any claim 
promulgated by the U.C.C., it provides a civil private right of action. 
V. Levels of Deceit: Criminal and Civil  
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“The goal of criminal law is to punish bad acts, whereas civil causes of action enforce the 
rights of private parties through compensation.”115  Civil claims are to remedy private disputes 
between two parties because of harm done directly to that plaintiff.  The remedies in civil cases 
typically range from monetary damages to put the aggrieved party in the place they were before 
the contract and specific performance, which gives the party exactly what they bargained for.
116
  
Criminal claims are brought by the state government or federal government against a defendant 
as a crime against the community as a whole.  The remedies in criminal cases typically range 
from monetary compensation to time served in prison.  Usually, criminal liability does not 
preclude civil liability.  Thus, a statute crafted should allow for both remedies, if needed.  
a. Real Life Applications and Examples 
Frequently, fake art turns up with most respected art dealers as well as on eBay.  It may 
be argued that the well-established art dealer situation is more troubling than that of a novice 
buyer.  First, if patrons are spending an extravagant amount of money on a piece of art, they will 
most likely hire an independent expert to authenticate the work.  At the same time, because 
patrons are paying such a high price for the art work, the sophisticated, experienced art buyers 
may rely to their detriment simply on the dealer’s reputation.  After all, how could Sotheby’s sell 
someone a fake work of art?  In October 2000, Sotheby's, “the world's largest art auction house, 
ha[d] been under investigation for alleged price-fixing and securities fraud.” 117  In October of 
2000, Sotheby's former President and CEO, Diana Brooks, pled guilty to price-fixing.
118
  Diana 
Brooks was sentenced to probation, 1000 hours of community service, 6 months house arrest, 
and ordered to pay a $350,000 fee after being found guilty of colluding with Christie’s to fix 
commission prices.
119
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Another high-powered Sotheby’s employee received a harsher sentence after being 
implicated by Diana Brooks.  In 2001, A. Alfred Taubman, the former chairman of Sotheby's 
Holdings was convicted of price-fixing, sentenced to a year and a day in prison and fined $7.5 
million dollars.
120
  Taubman maintained his innocence even after serving his sentence and 
claimed Diana Brooks lied to mitigate her crime.
121
   
Another prominent and once respected art dealer, Larry Salander was found guilty of 
grand larceny and ordered to pay $114 million dollars in restitution for selling artwork he did not 
own and pocketing the profit himself.
122
  Salander was entrusted with millions of dollars’ worth 
of art work and then sold it without permission and kept the proceeds.
123
  Salander made a 
statement to the court and the victims of his crime and the defense introduced evidence of mental 
health problems on behalf of Salander.
124
   
Another art dealer in Los Angeles, Matthew Taylor, was arrested and accused of money 
laundering, possession of stolen property and transportation of stolen property and is facing 100 
years in prison if convicted. 
125
  “Prosecutors say Taylor also affixed on some paintings fake 
labels from museums, such as the Guggenheim in New York, to make it appear the works had 
once been part of the collections at those institutions.”126   
More recently in 2012, a group of impressionist paintings that have been in circulation in 
the art world for years were deemed fake.
127
  “The [FBI] has been investigating at least two 
dozen paintings supplied by a Long Island dealer named Rosales and sold by Knoedler and 
another New York dealer.
128
  The works are attributed to Modernist masters like Rothko, Jackson 
Pollock, Franz Kline, Willem de Kooning and others, but several experts have called them 
forgeries.”129  The defendant maintains that the works are authentic, however.  In addition, 
another instance of crime was a mixture of selling counterfeit art and stealing an original art 
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work.  A museum in Venezuela was contacted by a Miami Gallery indicating that someone had 
offered to sell the Gallery the painting Odalisque in Red Pants by Matisse.
130
  “Experts at the 
museum inspected the likeness [in Venezuela] and were shocked to find that it was a 
fake…Someone had removed the original painting from its frame and put the fake in its place, 
leaving it to be exhibited as if it were the real thing. And no one noticed.” 131 
One art forger, John Myatt, was complicit in selling fake art on a much smaller scale. 
John Myatt, a single father, living in England, plead guilty to fraud and served four months in 
prison. Myatt made about $144,000 during this time.
132
  Myatt started creating works of art 
commissioned by friends for a fee.
133
  Then he was contacted by Drewe and he asked Myatt to 
paint some works for his own personal use.
134
  Then, without notice, Drewe passed one work off 
to Christie’s successfully without Myatt’s consent.135  Myatt painted about 200 works of art, 
while the operation was maintained by John Drewe, who was sentenced to six years in prison 
and made about $2.4 million dollars during the operation.
136
  John Drewe handled all of the sales 
as well as the forged provenances, the chain of ownership that should accompany each valuable 
work of art.
137
 
As time went on, Myatt was ignorant as to how Drewe was providing him with this 
money support his family.  An interesting caveat to this story is the fact that his fakes were 
unable to be detected for such an extended period of time.  Not only were the materials used 
inauthentic for the time period they were supposed to be painted in, the provenances were forged 
and also remained undetected.
138
  This is troubling since not even a large auction house like 
Christie’s was able to detect the forgery.  These are all large scale art forgeries and 
understandably there have been consequences including jail time and monetary compensation.    
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b. Proposed Federal Statute  
Despite the remedies for those swindled out of substantial amounts of money, no 
adequate remedies exist for those conned out of more modest amounts.  The federal legislature 
may be able to remedy this problem by constructing a statute that makes counterfeit art a strict 
liability offense and by imposing a financial statutory cap that would limit the reach of this strict 
liability statute.  For example, the criminal misdemeanor statute could read “[A]ny person who 
creates, sells, or auctions counterfeit or non-genuine art for $500 or less is strictly liability to the 
purchaser to the extent of the purchaser’s initial investment, up to five (5) times the amount of 
the purchaser’s initial investment but in no case less than double the amount originally sold for, 
and a maximum of 1 year in prison.”  This would protect the average, unsophisticated art buyer 
and allow for a remedy that would not require an unreasonable amount of attorney or expert fees.   
The guidelines for handing down criminal sentences must be refined for larger offenses 
as well.  As the valued amount of the work of art increases so should the punishments, however, 
intent must be introduced as a factor.  Strict liability should not be imposed if the statute outlines 
harsh penalties.  The felony statute should read “[A]ny person who knowingly or recklessly sells 
or auctions counterfeit or non-genuine art for more than $500 shall be liable to the purchaser to 
the extent of the purchaser’s initial investment, plus a fine up to five (5) times the purchaser’s 
investment, but in no case less than double the amount originally sold for, and prison time 
minimum one (1) year to maximum twenty (20) years.”  Judges should have clear guidelines in 
imposing sentences on convicted of selling or creating forged art.  Perhaps these unambiguous 
punishments will act as enough of a deterrent that they will discourage selling forged art.  The 
crime of selling forged art must ripen into a low-reward, high-risk crime in order to effectively 
stop this crime. 
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As seen above, many individuals, in a position of power also succumb to breaking the 
law.  The reasons for this may be purely speculative; however, one may suggest greed is the 
number one motivating factor.  Most disturbing is a high powered person, entrusted with art 
work, taking advantage of innocent consumers.  Common criminals are one group of people that 
are punished for selling counterfeit art.  Is Diana Brooks, former CEO of Sotheby’s, a common 
criminal?  It strikes a nerve when considering Ms. Brooks’ position of power being used for a 
criminal purpose, to defraud innocents.  One may expect that behavior from a “common 
criminal,” perhaps desperate for money to feed his family, like John Myatt.  Diana Brooks was 
not desperate for money; she was not on the brink of poverty, yet she defrauded people out of 
millions of dollars.  Of course the reason for committing a crime should be irrelevant, often 
Judges do take this information into account but it may provide for some leniency.  One may fail 
to see the commonality and justification as to why Diana Brooks received the sentence she did.  
Three months house arrest, a $350,000 fine, community service, and probation hardly seem 
appropriate for conspiracy that cost people collectively millions of dollars.   
A common theme here is that people entrusted with these precious art works yield to 
greed.  Perhaps if the law provided a stronger deterrent and imposed a higher standard of care on 
these individuals, less fraud and conspiracy would take place.  This standard would be similar to 
those of financial advisories who have a fiduciary duty to their clients. These advisors are 
entrusted with client’s money and are expected to behave morally.  Similarly, the CEO of 
Sotheby’s is entrusted with items of high monetary and cultural value.  These individuals are put 
in a position where their decisions can have long range consequences and they should have to be 
held responsible for that privilege.  The CEO of Sotheby’s has the ability to defraud the public 
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out of millions of dollars where as a private vendor on eBay would not be able to gross that high 
amount of profit without detection, or so one would hope.  
VI. Conclusion: “Those who do not want to imitate anything, produce nothing.-Dali 
Art forgeries may be prosecuted federally, by the state, criminally and civilly with 
permutations of each of the previous four categories.  Despite the vast array of existing legal 
heroism aimed to prevent art forgery and guidelines to remedy it, the question must be 
articulated, is this enough?  Obviously, art work cannot and is not produced in a vacuum.  For 
thousands of years, artists have been inspired by each other’s work, always attempting to add an 
extra creative element somewhere.  Dali’s quote above exemplifies this in the sense that 
imitation in art work is perfectly acceptable, but brazen, brush stroke for brush stroke copying 
and reselling a work of art for pecuniary gain is not acceptable.  Those who do the latter should 
have to face devastating consequences.  
An analogy to forgery in the art world is “biting” in the hip hop world.  Biting is simply 
copying another artist’s work whether it is music or lyrics without giving proper credit.139  Of 
course there are legal ramifications that entitle an artist to monetary or injunctive relief under a 
copyright infringement statute.  However, the consequences of biting extend further than the 
legal consequences to social failure.  If an artist is even accused of biting, that artist will suffer 
irreparable social consequences and lose all respect from other members of the community for 
this offense.
140
   
Regardless of which industry the forgery stems from, there is one critical, central take 
away: liability or punishment is proper and must be imposed to remedy this great moral failure.  
A balance must be struck between the punishment and the offense, whether it is criminal or civil, 
state or federal. Imposing a federal statute such as the one proposed earlier, would greatly deter 
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criminals from selling forged art and would transform the crime of counterfeiting art from a low-
risk, high-reward crime into a high-risk, low-reward crime. 
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